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Column:  
The Physics of Digital Information-Part 21 
Fred Cohen 
In part 1 of this series (Cohen, 2011a), we discussed some of the basics of 
building a physics of digital information. Assuming, as we have, that science is 
about causality and that a scientific theory should require that cause(C) 
produces effect (E) via mechanism M (written C→ME), we explore that general 
theory of digital systems from the perspective of attributing effects (i.e., traces 
of activities in digital systems) to their causes. Full details of the current 
version of this physics are available online
2
, and in this article, we explore a 
few more of them. 
Previous results questioning consensus around common definitions for the field 
of digital forensics (Cohen, 2010) have led to additional study suggesting that 
definitions presented before discussion lead to substantial consensus (Cohen, 
2012). Thus each item discussed will start with a loose definition and example. 
Definition: A unique history is a single C→ME chain that is the only consistent 
path from the cause to the effect. 
For example, suppose we have an imitative copy
3
 of an asserted electronic 
message sent from one party to another. Given that trace and a set of claims 
about the computers involved, a unique history would demonstrate that there is 
one and only one party who could have produced the resulting trace, using one 
and only one process, at one and only one time, from one and only one place. 
Current state does not always imply unique history. 
More generally there are two important rules that are almost always true for the 
DFE examiner: 
Given initial state and inputs, later outputs and states are known. 
Given final state and output, inputs and prior states are not unique. 
Digital systems have a finite number of states (settings of the digital values 
across all of the stored values in the system). The mechanisms that manipulate 
digital data are commonly called finite state machines or automata (FSM), 
                                                 
1 This editorial piece is extracted and modified from Cohen (2011c). 
2 http://infophys.com/ 
3 Imitative copy := A reproduction of both the form and content of a record. This is what is 
typically available and called an “exact”, “bit image”, or “forensically sound”, copy in digital 
forensics. See Cohen (2011b). 
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often detailed in terms of Moore machines (Moore, 1956) or Mealy machines 
(Mealy, 1955). In such machines, current state and input lead to the next state 
and output of the machine in a unique way. That is, given the initial state and 
sequence of inputs, the final state and sequence of outputs are uniquely 
determined. Thus time transforms the artifice as it moves forward. But in 
digital forensics, we generally don't start with causes and try to predict effects. 
Rather, we start with effects and seek to identify their causes. In modern 
computers it is almost never possible to “run time backwards” given a set of 
traces, and identify a unique history that led to the traces found.  
Definition: Convergence asserts that, as a mechanism transforms inputs and 
internal states into outputs and subsequent internal states over time, different 
inputs produce identical outputs. Divergence asserts the opposite, that for the 
same input, different outputs are detectable. 
For example, if we test rolling a rock down a hill repeatedly and, no matter 
how tightly we control the process, there are slightly different outcomes each 
time, this would be divergence. But if we ran an FSM forward again and again 
with different inputs and initial states each time, and got identical outputs and 
final states, this would be convergence.  
Digital space converges while physical space diverges with time. 
The digital artifice over time is, in general, a many-to-one transform. 
Furthermore, inverting time in an FSM produces potentially enormous class 
sets of possible prior states and inputs, and determining them precisely is too 
complex to be done for nontrivial systems (Backes, Kopf, & Rybalchenko, 
2009). This is at odds with the current model of the natural world, in that 
physical space is generally believed to have an essentially infinite number of 
possible states and to increase in entropy over time so that order is always 
reduced. No matter how tightly we control a physical experiment, there will 
always be a level of granularity at which outputs are differentiable. The 
difference between the digital and physical spaces is greatly influenced by the 
fact that the digital space has only finite granularity in time and space, as was 
discussed in the first article in this series. 
Definition: Equivalent machines are, possibly different machines that, from an 
external perspective, behave identically with respect to a defined set of external 
data. 
For example, different compilers may transform the same program into 
different binary executable codes that work slightly differently even though 
they produce the same outputs from the same inputs. 
Many FSMs are equivalent. 
An unlimited number of different FSMs may produce the same output 
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sequence from the same or different input sequences. For example, at the level 
of computer programs in common use, an editor, digital recorder, or user 
program, may produce the same outputs from different inputs. With incomplete 
traces, we cannot uniquely determine prior states and inputs. To the extent that 
traces are more or less complete, we may or may not be able to uniquely 
determine or bound the set of programs that might have produced the traces. 
We may not even be able to determine the extent of completeness of traces we 
have. 
Definition: A lossy transform is a mapping from input to output that cannot be 
reversed to produce a unique input. That is, it is a many to one transform. 
For example, JPEG files are often compressed using the JPEG lossy 
compression algorithm (Hamilton, 1992). The results trade off space for 
quality. 
Hash functions and digital signatures as lossy and thus not unique. 
Any transform that produces output space of a predefined size for an input 
space of a larger size is lossy and thus not unique. As an example, an MD5 or 
SHA hash of a file does not uniquely identify that file. There are in fact an 
unlimited number of other files that would produce that same hash value. Being 
careful, note that this is not an infinite number of files – only an unlimited 
number of them. To see this, suppose we generate file after file of length one 
bit more than the length of the hash. Since the length is one bit more, there are 
twice as many files of that length than there are hash values. If we create one 
after another of these files, eventually we will exhaust all of the possible values 
for the hash function, and as soon as we get to one more unique input file than 
the number of possible hash value, we are guaranteed that two different input 
files will have identical hash values. This does not make such hashes useless in 
digital forensics, but it does mean that they do not uniquely identify an input or 
certify that a produced file is unaltered from its initial creation. 
A summary of properties 
There are many other properties of digital systems and the physics of digital 
information. A summary extracted from the book chapter identified above is 
included here to expand thinking about these issues. 
Digital World Physical World 
Finite time granularity (the clock) Infinite time granularity 
Finite space granularity (the bit) Infinite space granularity 
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Digital World Physical World 
Observation without alteration No observation w/out alteration 
Exact copies, original intact No exact copy, original changed 
Theft without direct loss Theft produces direct loss 
Finite (fast) rate of movement No locality (entanglement) 
An artifice created by people A reality regardless of people 
Finite State Machines (FSMs) Physics and field equations 
Homing sequences may exist No perfect repeatability 
Forward time perfect prediction Forward time non-unique 
Backward time non-unique Backward time unique 
Digital space converges in time Physical space diverges in time 
The results are always bits The results are always continua 
Results are always "Exact" Results never perfectly known 
Time is a partial ordering Time is real(location) 
Errors accumulate Errors are local 
Representation limits accuracy Reality is what it is 
Precision may exceed accuracy Precision is potentially infinite 
Forgery can be perfect Forgery cannot be perfect 
DFE is almost always latent Some evidence is latent 
DFE is trace but not transfer Traces comes from transfers 
DFE is circumstantial Evidence is circumstantial 
DFE is hearsay Evidence is physical 
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Digital World Physical World 
DFE cannot place a person at a place at 
a time 
Evidence may put an individual at a 
place at a time 
DFE can show consistency or 
inconsistency only 
Evidence can show more than just 
consistency 
Probability is dubious Probability is often usable 
Content has information density No defined density limits 
Content density variable Content density not controlled 
Content perfectly compressible No perfect compression 
Digital signatures, fingerprints, etc. 
generated from content 
Body (phenome) generated from DNA 
(genome) 
Content meaning is dictated by context No universal theory of meaning but 
physicality exists regardless 
Context tends to be global and 
dramatically changes meaning 
Context tends to be local and 
incrementally changes meaning 
FSMs come to a conclusion Eats shoots and leaves 
Cognitive limits from program Cognitive limits from physiology 
Hardware fault models from computer 
engineering 
Hardware fault models from physics 
Time and space tradeoffs known Tradeoffs unclear 
Near perfect virtualization and 
simulation possible 
No virtualization 
Many nearly or equivalent FSMs The uncertainty principal 
Undecidable problems Nothing known as "unthinkable" 
Computational complexity limits 
computations 
No well understood limits on new 
ideas 
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Digital World Physical World 
Everything is decidable Many things are not decidable 
Consistency is guaranteed Consistency is possible 
Completeness is guaranteed Completeness is possible 
Consistency AND completeness Consistency OR completeness 
Time limits on achievable results Time limits unknown 
Complexity-based designs Complexity not determinant 
Fault tolerance by design Normally not fault tolerant 
Accidental assumption violations Assumptions non-violable 
Intentional assumption violations Assumptions non-violable 
Discontinuous space Continuous space 
Discontinuous time Continuous time 
Minor differences amplified near 
discontinuities 
Differences retain fidelity  
Major differences suppressed away 
from discontinuities 
Differences retain fidelity 
Identical use of an interface may 
produce different results 
No such thing as identical, each thing 
is unique 
Ordering may be reversed Ordering subject to light time 
Value sorts may be reversed Value sorts remain consistent 
Actuate-sensors loop errors Interference based errors 
Sensors/actuators limited in physical 
properties 
All physical properties present 
Table 1 – Summary of Information Physics 
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A final comment 
There is a lot to learn about the physics of digital information, and from the 
perspective of digital forensics, this is the sort of knowledge that is 
increasingly necessary to understanding what you are doing when you 
undertake to testify about such matters. 
I urge you to review the details of the physics in its full richness and with its 
current limitations, and to draw your own conclusions. Read the chapter cited 
above, comment on it, prove it is wrong if and where it is, show its limits, and 
move the field forward. 
And I urge you to challenge yourself and others to up your game. In case after 
case, we encounter self-identified experts who don't understand the basics of 
how things work and end up testifying with inadequate basis. In many cases 
their conclusions may be right, but their presentation and the facts they provide 
may not support them. In other cases, their conclusions are not right at all. At 
the heart of it all is the lack of attention to the basics of the science that 
underlies digital forensics. This is a problem we hope to continue to address in 
this series and this publication. 
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